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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RUTH ETHEL DRURY
MARSHALL, et al.,
Plaintiff and Respondents,
Case No. 8792

vs.
GEORGE T. TAYLER,
Defendant .and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
S'TATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall brought action
against the defendant, George ·T. Tayler, sounding
in tort; Fern Drury Tayler through intervention
sought recovery for personal injuries to herself resulting from the same alleged tortious act of the
defendant.
Fern Drury Tayler was during all times with
which we are here concerned the wife of the defendant.
From an adverse verdict in the Court below
1
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defendant brings his cause to this Honorable Court
on appeal.
SiTATEMEN'T OF FACT:S
We will be concerned here with five principal
persons: (1) the wife, Fern Drury ·Tayler; (2)
the wife's sister, Ruth Drury Marshall; (3) the
wife's sister's husband, Leland Marshall; {4) the
wife's mother, Ethel Go Drury; (5) the defendant,
George T. :Tayler. For purpose of clarity we shall
refer to them in this brief as the wife, sister, brother-in-law, mother and defendant.
:The wife testified that she and defendant were
1narried at Gallup, New Mexico on March 2, 1951;
(Tr. 152), that she lived with him as man and wife
for five· years ( Tr. 153). Hovvever, the wife lived
at the home of her folks while the defendant occupied
a hotel room W'hereat she said she saw l1im from
the time she got off work until late at night. (Tr.
154). She visited with him almost nightly during
the five year period but she never did attempt to
establish a residence for herself and defendant (Tr.
154); although at one time he had an apartment
(Tr. 154). The wife had never had an altercation
with the defendant (Tr. 155), and sl1e knew that
the defendant always evaded anything unpleasant
(Tr. 158).
At a family gathering sometime near the
2
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middle of August, 1956, there was an altercation
and certain remarks made for which the defendant
was chastised by the sister and the mother and
thereupon the defendant "opened the door and walked out." (Tr. 176, 177, 178). The defendant had
a reputation for being one to evade unpleasantness
('Tr. 158; lines 6, 7, 8, Tr. 281; Tr. 27 4; Tr. 141).
Defendant thereafter went to Grand County to estab1is'h residence and secure a divorce ( Tr. 168) .
We make the above recitation for the purpose of
acquainting this Court with the relationship as it
existed between the wife and the defendant.
The following facts go directly to the issue.
On September 11, 1956, the wife, sister, brother-in-law, and the mother left Salt Lake City in
the brother-in-law's automobile at about 7:00 p.m.
(Tr. 111). Their destination was either 'Thompson
or Moab, Utah (Tr. 111); they were looking for
the defendant (Tr. 139). The party arrived at
Thompson sometime between tvvelve and twelvethirty midnight (Tr. 112). Defendant's car was
parked at a motel there (Tr. 112. The party registered into a unit at the motel (Tr. 112).
Before retiring and at that late hour the wife
and the brother-in-law went to the defendant's
motel unit, tried the screen door which was locked,
called to the defendant and attempted to have a conversation with him. They received no response from
3
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defendant. Plaintiff's testimony and that of their
witnesses was to the effect that no commotion was
occasioned during this attempted interview with
defendant. Failing their purpose the party then retired for the night, the wife, sister and mother to
the motel unit, the brother-in-law to a bed made
down in his station wago11. The brother-in-law removed only his shoes and laid on top of the covers
(Tr. 113-119). The defendant testified that he saw
from his room the brother-in-law's car drive up to
the motel; that the wife and brother-in-law pounded
on his door and tried to break it down and caused
considerable disturbance for some thirty 1ninutes
(Tr. 29·2, 293), which male occupants of another
unit complained of the terrible noise being carried
on (Tr. 293).
Defendant then waited in his motel u11til 2
or 2 :15 A.M. and at that time when a truck
was passing :by went from his room to his car;
entered the car, locked the doors and started the
motor ( Tr. 293, 294).
'The plaintiffs, who had disrobed only to the
extent of removing dresses, shoes and stockings,
were awakened by a door slamming (Tr. 159):
they arose and ran out to defendant's car. The wife
ran to the left side and called to the brother-in-law
('Tr. 160). The sister ran to the right side (Tr.
260). The wife took ahold of the door handle on
4
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the left side (Tr. 161); the sister took ahold of
the door handle on the right side ( Tr. 260). Both
plaintiffs testified that they spoke to the defendant
at this time but that the defendant did not answer
them ('Tr. 161 and 260, 261). The defendant testified that he asked both women to get off the car
(Tr. 350).
The defendant backed his car up to obtain
clearance and then drove forward through the gas
station onto the highway. There is some testimony
in the record [denied by defendant] that he "weaved'' the car when backing and there is -a conflict
in the evidence as to the speed at which defendant
drove away. Both plaintiffs fell or were thrown
to the ground and were injured.
Plaintiffs' complaints allege the act of defendant vvas willful and intentional and the pre-trial
order limited the issue to an intentional injury (Tr.
12) . However, plaintiffs abandoned the theory of
intentional injury and ill will ('Tr. 155, 156) and
at the trial's conclusion the Court, over defendant's
objection, granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the
pre-trial order to include negligence ('Tr. 371). The
pre-trial judge had earlier denied such motion ('Tr.
26) as had the trial judge (Tr. 27, 28).
We think this to be a fair statement of the case
sufficient for the purposes of this appeal.
5
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SITATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS HAVING PLACED 'THEMSELVES
IN A POSITION OF PERIL ASSUMED THE RISK OF
INJURY.
POIN'T II.
PLAINTIFFS TRESPASSED UPON DEFENDANT'S
M·OTOR VEHICLE AND DEFENDANT OWED PLAINTIFFS ONLY THE DUTY OF NOT WILLFULLY OR
WAN'TONLY INJURING THEM.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO
CAUSE OF AC'TION.
POINT IV.
THE ·COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MO'TION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
POINT V.
A WIFE HAS NO ·cAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY
INFLIC'TED BY THE HUSBAND DURING COVERTURE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS HAVING PLACED THEMSELVES
IN A POSITION OF PERIL ASSUMED THE RISK OF
INJURY.

When a plaintiff brings himself within the
operation of the maxim, volenti non fit injuria, he
6
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cannot recover. Westborough Country Club v. Palmer, C.A. Mo., 204 F.2d 143. In Smith v. Mining
Company, 27 Utah 307, 32'5, 75 Pac. 749, this Court
said:
"Mr. 'Thompson, in his Commentaries on
the law of Negligence, vol. 1, sec. 185, says:
'Where a person, by his own deliberate act,
brings an injury upon himself, he can not
make it the ground of recovering damages
against another, where he is not impelled
thereto by some imminent danger, or by some
exciting or exasperating circumstances, for
which that other is responsible. The principle
that a person can not make his own wrong
or his voluntary act, v;hether wrongful or not,
the ground of recovering damages from another, has found an expression in the maxim,
"Volenti non fit injuria.' "
The applicability of the doctrine of assumption of risk is based upon the knowledge and appreciation of a danger and the voluntary occupation of
a position of danger in disregard of the use of
ordinary care.
There is no conflict in the evidence to the fact
that plaintiffs ran, one to each side of defendant's
automobile, and held on to the door handles thereof.
'The wife on the left side (Tr. 161) ; the sister, on
the right side (Tr. 260). The plaintiffs must have
had knowledge of the danger and certain ly they
voluntarily exposed themselves to it. The facts in
this case meet every test laid down by this Court
1

7
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in ·Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075,
for the application of the doctrine of assumption
of risk. In ·Clay v. Dunford this Court said:
"!The defense of assumption of risk as a
legal concept requires that the plaintiff must
have looked, must have seen and must have
known of a danger, voluntarily subjecting
·himself thereto and ·consenting that if injury
result, he who may have negligently exposed
him thereto should be relieved of any liability
therefor. It has been said that 'knowledge of
the risk is the watchword of * * * assumption of risk' ''. * * *
POIN·T II.
PLAINTIFFS 'TRESPASSED UPON DEFENDANT'S
MOTOR VEHICLE AND DEFENDANT OWED PLAIN'TIFFS ·ONLY THE DUTY OF NOT WILLFULLY OR
WANTONLY INJURING THEM.

Plaintiffs trespassed upon defendant's auton1obile - this fact cannot be disputed. "Under ordinary circumstances there is no liability for injury
to trespassers whether the trespass is committed
on land or on personal property." 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Sec. 24, p. 440. "A motorist owes no duty to
a trespasser whose presence is unknown; and, zehen
the trespasser's presenc.e is knozcn, the operator
ow.es him only the duty not zcillfully or war/;tonly
to injure him." (Emphasis ours). 60 C.J.S., Motor
Vehicles, Sec. 401, p. 1020.
We direct the Court's attention to the special
8
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verdicts in these causes wherein the jury found
defendant negligent in not using due care (Tr. 83,
86) . For a discussion of the accepted meanings of
"willfulness and wantonness" see the remarks of
Mr. Justice Straup, in J,ensen v. Denver and R.G.R.
Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1188, 1189. Under
a somewhat similar fact situation to the cause at
bar, Byers v. Gunn, Florida, 81 So.2d 723, that Court
declared that where a girl sat on an automobile fender after being refused admittance into the automobile by friend, and the friend started to drive
off, and the girl fell off the fender and was hurt,
girl's status at time was that of trespasser. The
defendant in this cause locked the car doors and
thus refused plaintiff's admittance to his automobile. While persisting to attach themselves to the
automobile, plaintiffs trespassed. Viewing the facts
in this case in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we respectfully contend that there is no showing of willfulness or wantonness on the part of the
defendant such as would support the verdict in
plaintiffs' favor.
''IThe demarcation between ordinary negligence, and willful and wanton disregard, is
that in the latter the actor was fully aware
of the danger and should have realized its
proba;ble consequences, yet deliberately avoided all precaution to prevent disaster. A failure
to act in prevention of accident is but simple
negligence; a mentally active restraint from
9
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such action is willful. Omitting to weigh consequences is simple negligence; refusing to
weigh them is willful. Performance of a dangerous act willfully, under certain circumstane:es, as in an emergency, is permissible,
.and will not subject the actor to liability * * *
(Emphasis ours).''

Pettingell v. Molde (Colo. 1954), 271 P.2d 1038,
1042.
The Court's attention is directed to the following colloquy between the trial judge and counsel for
plaintiffs:
The Court: If you want to show he had
an ill will toward them and hurt them intentionally, you can go into that. * * *
Mr. Cassity: I do not intend to show
he had any ill will Your Honor.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO
CAUSE OF AC'TION.

At the conclusion of the trial the defendant
made the following motion to the Court:
MR. HANSON: Comes now the defendant and moves the Court to direct a verdict
of no cause of action in favor of the defendant
and against both of the plaintiffs on the following grounds :
( 1) That the eYidence conclusively
shows, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs
in seizing the defendant's car, con1mitted an
assult upon him, and that his actions there10
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after were motivated solely by the desire to
escape plaintiffs and their associate Marshall,
and the evidence conclusively shows that in
attempting to escape, the defendant did not
use unreasonable force.
( 2) That if plaintiffs' action in seizing
the door handles to the defendant's car, did
not amount to an assault upon the defendant,
then their status, in seizing the handles of said
car, was that of trespassers, and the defendant's only duty tovvard them was not to
wilfully injure them; that the evidence is conclusive that he did not attempt to, or did not
wilfully injure them, but that his actions were
motivated solely by the desire to escape a possible harm or danger to himself.
The evidence also conclusively shows that
the plaintiffs could have released the handles
of his car any time after it started to move,
and thereby could have avoided further danger or injury to themselves.
That if the case Vv"'as submitted to the
jury on negligence we contend the only issue
that COlild possibly be here, was that of intentional acts on the part of the plaintiffs, in
seizing and clinging to the car, but if submitted to the jury on negligence, it is the contention of the defendant, that plaintiffs were
contributorily negligent, as a matter of law,
in failing to release the handles of the car,
and, further, that they assumed the risk, as
a matter of law, in continuing to hold on to
said door handles until they were forced to
release it, by the moven1ent of the car, or the
actual driving of the car by defendant. [Tr.
369, 370].
11
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The Court denied the motion ('Tr. 370). The
evidence conclusively shows [there is no conflict]
plaintiffs assumed the risk of injury to themselves
as a matter of law; and, plaintiffs were contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiffs readily admit that they voluntarily attached themselves
to defendant's automobile by seizing onto the door
handles on each side of the vehicle. Each plaintiff
could have avoided injury to herself by (a) not
taking hold of the door handle: (b) by releasing
her hold.
"It has :been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in
all time to come, that there can be no recovery
for an injury caused by the mutual default of
both parties. When it can be shown that it
would not have happened except for the culpa'ble negligence of the party injured, concurring with that of the other party, no action
can be maintained." 1 Tlwmp. Comm. Neg.
section 186; Wharton, Neg. Section 73; 2
Jaggard on Torts, 960; Ray, Neg. Imp. Dut.
Fass. 669, 670.
R~ailroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am.
Dec. 3·23; Smith v. Mining Co. (1904), 27 Utah 307,
325, 75 Pac. 749.
In this case the jury found that defendant was
guilty of negligence in the operation of his automo'bile and they charged defendant with all the consequences of the accident regardless of plaintiff's
conduct. That they had no right to do. If plaintiffs
12
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had exercised that ordinary care, prudence, and foresight which the law requires of everyone for their
own safety, the accident could not have happened.
"A plaintiff who does not observe the
standards of due care the law imposes upon
him cannot recover." [Jensen v. Logan City,
89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 78; Pollari v. Salt Lake
City, Ill Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111.]
'T·he facts of this case bring it within the rule
stated by this Court in Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d
68, 262 p .2d 2'78:
"Contributory negligence would * * *
be a question of law where the evidence showed, with such certainty that reasonable minds
could not differ thereon, that the conduct in
question * * * failed to meet the standard
of due care."
There is no conflict in the evidence that the car
first backed up (Tr. 120, 121), stopped ('Tr. 121,
122), then went forward (Tr. 122); that the plaintiffs fell from the car after it proceeded forward
( Tr. 162, 263). Common knowledge and experience
tells us that there had to be a period of time when,
after backing, the car was immobile and that plaintiffs could have released their holds while the car
was standing still.
In Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,
259 P. 2d 297, this Court said, in part:
"* * * Dr. Morris appears to be confronted with two horns of a dilemma, either
(a) the room was sufficiently lighted so that
13
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he could and should by the exercise of ordinary, reasonable care and observation for his
own safety see the chair and avoid walking
into it, or (b) the room, or the portion thereof in question, was so dark that he could not
see an object such as a chair, in which event
due care would have required him to turn on
a light.
"As to alternative (a), the statement of
the proposition answers itself. An object the
size of a chair is something which one using
ordinary care ought to see; and that he should
heed it, the Doctor's unfortunate experience
painfully demonstrated. * * *
"* * * But upon mature reflection, rational minds will be of one accord as to where
the responsibility lies. Whether Dr. Morris
chooses alternative (a) above, that the room
was light, or (b) that it, or a portion thereof,
was dark, we see no escape for him: we believe all reasona'ble minds would conclude
that he was guilty of contributory negligence.

* * * although we are sensitive of the
duty of courts to safeguard the rights of citizens to have grievances fully tried on the
merits to courts and juries under proper circumstances, this does not lead to the necessity
or desirability of such submission where, taking the evidence and all fair inferences therefrom most favorable to a plaintiff, all reasonable minds must yet conclude that his own lack
of due care proximately contributed to cause
his injury. * * *"
The facts in the instant case, it appears to
the writer, point to an even more clear case of con14
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tributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs here.
In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d
4'53, the plaintiff exposed himself to an obvious
danger, this Court declared :
''* * * the right to hav.e ~a jury pass upon
issues of fact does not include the right to
hav.e a caus.e submitted to a jury in the hop.e
of 1a verdict where the facts undisputably show
that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. * * *"
And
"* * * where it is clear that any person
of normal intelligence in his position must
have understood the dang.er, the issue must be
d-ecided by the court."
In Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 874,
this Court opined tha;t:
"A reasonable person makes some observations along the path he chooses to follow."
And found plaintiff to have been contributorily
negligent as a matter of law for having neglected
to use the care required of a prudent man.
POIN'T IV.
'THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAIN'TIFF'S
MO'TION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.

It cannot be said that plaintiffs did not trespass upon defendant's automobile. As we have pointed out in our Point II of this brief, the defendant
owed to plaintiffs, as tresspassers, only the duty of
15
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not wilfully or wantonly causing them injury. The
record fails to disclose and wilful, wanton, intentional or malicious act on the part of defendant.
T·he jury found that the acts of the defendant in injuring the plaintiff Marshall were not activated
by malice ; and, that the actions of the defendant
in injuring the plaintiff Tayler were not motivated
by malice (Tr. 84, 86). Malice in law is the intentio'ltal doing of a wrongful act without just cause
or excuse. ''Wilfullness" implies an act done intentionally and designedly; "wantonness" implies action without regard to the rights of others, a conscious failure to observe care, a conscious invasion
of the rights of others, wilful, unrestrained action.
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition.
We submit an act done without malice is not
"wilful'' or "intentional"; a "not-wilful" act cannot be "wanton" in the eyes of the law.
POIN'T V.
A WIFE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY
INFLIC'TED BY T'HE HUSBAND DURING COVER'TURE.

We are familiar with the ruling of this Court
in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696,
wherein Mr. Justice Wade wrote "* * * under our
statutes a wife may recover fron1 her husband for
intentionally inflicted injuries. * * *" The jury in
16
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our cause found only that the defendant was "negligent in not using due care" and that the injury to
the plaintiff wife was not motivated by malice (R.
86). There was no intentional injury inflicted upon
the wife by the defendant husband in this cause.
Mr. Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion said,
"* * * the plaintiff may sue the defendant for an
alleged intentional personal injury coramitted during
the interlocutory period; * * *" and, went on to carefully point out certain considerations which " * * *
may well be deemed to be of sufficient importance
to lead to the conclusions that such suits should not
be maintainable during coverture. * * *"The Justice
declared: "* * * If such suits can be maintained,
widespread insurance coverage, particularly in automobile cases, poses a great temptation for collusion,
which it should not be the policy of the law to encourage. * * *" (Emphasis ours). This statement
is in complete accord with the general weight of
authority. We feel that to further relax the common
law rule in this jurisdiction would indeed create
an undesirable situation and it is our considered
opinion that the Legislature, in conferring equality
of right to sue, did not confer a right of action never
possessed by husband or wife at common law. Conley
v. Conley, 9!2 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 92'2, 925.
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable in its
fact situation from T~aylor v. Patten, supra, in that
17
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(a) the injuries to the wife were clearly not intentionally inflicted; and, (b) the parties were married
and not divorced on September 12, 1956, the date
of the accident. The parties' divorce decree was
entered October 16, 19'56 (Tr. 290).
IT·his Court in Taylor v. Patten, supra, in its
main opinion, the concurring opinion and in the dissenting opinion exhaustively reviews the authorities
on this issue. We would not belabor the Court with
those authorities of which the Court is fully cognizant. However, since the reporting of Taylor v. Patten, there has 'been published an exhaustive annotation, 43 ALR 2d 634, wherein the "Summary" opens
with the following declaration:
'~The

relatively great amount of litigation
in which the question of the right of one spouse
to bring an action against the other for personal injuries has been raised, is due, in large
part, to the widespread enactment of married
women's statutes relieving "\Vives from many
of the disabilities imposed upon them by the
common law. The argu111ent has been, and continues to be, made that these enactments, most
of which, either in terms or by implication,
permit a married woman to sue and be sued
as if she were single, have the effect of abrogating the rule of spousal disability. In
what must now be referred to as a dwindling
majority of jurisdictions this arg·u1nent has
been rejected by tl1e courts, and in one jurisdiction - Illinois - the argument, after
having been accepted by the courts, was re18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jected by the legislature, which amended the
Illinois married women's statute to specifically bar actions by one spouse against the
other for torts occurring during coverture.

*

*

*

"In the case of a spouse's post-divorce
suit for personal injuries caused by the other
spouse during coverture, the courts are agreed
that the spousal disability rule operates to
bar the suit.''

* * * Abb~tt v. Abbott ( 1877) 67 Me. 304,
24 Am Rep 2'7 * * *.
- ·
* * * Callow v. Thomas ( 1948) 3'22 Mass.
550, 78 NE2d 637, 2 ALR2d 63'2.
* * * Bandfield v. B.andfield ( 1898) 117
Mich. 80, 75 NW 287, 40 LRA 757, 72 Am
St Rep 550.* * * Strom v. Strom (1906) 98 Minn. 427,
107 NW 1047, 6 LRA NS 191, 116 Am St Rep
387.
* * * Nickerson v. Nickerson ( 1886) 65 'Tex.
281; Lunt v. Lunt (1938, Tex. Civ App) 121
SW2d 445, error dismd (recognizing rule).
* * * Schultz v. Christopher (1911) 65
Wash. 496, 118 P. 629, 38 LRA NS 780.
* * * Phillips v. Barnett (1876) LR 1 QB
Div 436.
The majority view denies the right of action.
The states appear divided 31 to 17 with Utah aligned with the minority on the authority of Taylor v.
Patten. We do not read T~aylor v. Patten as completely abrogating the cor.amon-law rule of spousal
19
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disability, or as authorization for civil action based
upon simple negligence duri11g coverture.
Concluding, we would call the Court's attention to the case of Romero v. Romero ( 1954), 58
N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748, wherein that Court in its
unanimous opinion holds :
"It appears to have been the purpose of
the act of 1897 (19-606 supra.) [married
woman statute] to give the wife a remedy
to sue alone for actionable wrongs which formerly could not be independently redressed.
It removed the common law procedural barrier that a wife must join with her husband
in all actions for or against her, but, we are
of opinion, and so hold, that it did not create
a substantive right of action against her husband for a tort committed against her. This
view is not only supported by the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Tltompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111,
54 L. Ed. 1180, but is in accord with the general weight of authority as is reflected by decisions of thirty sister states and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii. * * *" (Emphasis added) .
CON·CLUSION
The evidence shows that the wife, sister, mother
and brother-in-law descended upon the de~endant
in force in the middle of the night for no other purpose, they say, than to have a talk with him. With
some apprehension as to the Inotives of this group
20
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the defendant attempted to fold his. tent like the
Arabs and silently steal away. Defendant's attempt
to maintain the peace and the status quo was frustrated through the assault and trespass of plaintiffs
upon him; the intentional acts of the plaintiffs resulted in what they should have known could well
occur, personal injury to thernselves; a regrettable
but understandable happenstance often known to
occur under such circumstances.
The verdict should be set aside and plaintiffs
sent hence with naught.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN AND ALLEN,
WALTER L. BUDGE

Attorneys for Appellant.
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